










































Prospects for timbre physicalism
Citation for published version:
Isaac, A 2018, 'Prospects for timbre physicalism', Philosophical Studies, vol. 175, no. 2, pp. 503–529.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0880-y
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s11098-017-0880-y
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Feb. 2020
Prospects for timbre physicalism
Alistair M. C. Isaac1
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Timbre is that property of a sound that distinguishes it other than pitch
and loudness, for instance the distinctive sound quality of a violin or flute. While the
term is obscure, the concept has played an important, implicit role in recent phi-
losophy of sound. Philosophers have debated whether to identify sounds with
properties of waves, events, or objects. Many of the intuitive considerations in this
debate apply most clearly to timbre qualities. Two prominent forms of timbre
physicalism have emerged: one identifying timbre with the spectral composition of
proximal waves; the second identifying timbre with the mechanical vibrations at a
sound source. I demonstrate that the first possibility is conceptually unsatisfying,
while the second fails to meet the standards of rigor established by the color
physicalism literature. One response to these worries might be to adopt a more
modest, non-reductive realism about timbre, such as the ecological view of
J. J. Gibson.
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1 Introduction
Do qualities as we experience them in perception exist independently of us, as
objective features of the world? This question of perceptual realism has been
pursued most extensively in the case of color, and positions developed in the
philosophy of color have shaped and informed the burgeoning philosophy of other
sense modalities. Color physicalism, the view that color may be identified with or
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reduced to a well-defined physical kind, such as surface spectral reflectance, has
been especially influential—in part because it is a position that engages closely with
the science of color and its external correlates. Here I examine the auditory quality
of timbre through the lens of the science of sound and its correlates, asking whether
it may be identified with or reduced to some objective physical feature(s) of the
world in a manner analogous to that of color physicalism. Many arguments about
the ontology of sound turn most directly on intuitions about timbre, and so a
rigorous analysis of timbre physicalism should shed light on more general questions
about what sounds are and where we find them in nature.
If the term ‘‘timbre’’ is familiar at all, it is typically from a musical context,
where we use it to describe the characteristic sound quality of a musical
instrument: a violin has a different timbre than a clarinet, for instance. More
generally, timbre is just the quality of a sound that distinguishes it other than its
pitch, loudness, or duration. This negative, or ‘‘dust bin’’ definition, identifying
timbre as whatever is left over after subtracting out the best understood auditory
qualities, is deeply dissatisfying, but it is a symptom of the fact that, unlike the
case of color, we do not have a rich specialized vocabulary for describing our
timbre experiences.1 Nevertheless, we are all just as familiar with timbre qualities
as with colors, and we do manage to refer to them, either onomatopoeically—what
is that strange buzzing?—or by reference to a (potential) source—it sounds like a
giant bee!
The science of timbre is not nearly as mature as the science of color.
Nevertheless, it provides results analogous to those that have become important in
debates about color realism on the key phenomena of correlation, constancy, and
similarity. Color sensations are correlated with features in the world, for instance
surface spectral reflectance; our attributions of color exhibit constancy with some of
these correlates across changes in others, as when a sheet of paper looks white in
both dim fluorescent and broad daylight; and colors stand in determinate similarity
relations, e.g. orange is more similar to red than to blue. The correlates of color
serve as candidates for a realist analysis, and the constancy with which we attribute
colors to a correlate counts as evidence in favor of this analysis. Similarities are also
evidence in the debate, and if the correlates of color do not stand in the appropriate
similarity relations—if the surface reflectance for orange is not more similar to that
of red than to that of blue—this fact must be explained, or explained away by the
successful physicalist.2 We find analogous aspects of the science of timbre in the
debate about timbre physicalism: correlates of timbre are candidates for a
1 Some date this negative definition to Helmholtz (1885, 19f); it is the one adopted by the Acoustical
Society of America, and is discussed in classic texts such as Bregman (1990, 92f). Alternative definitions
of timbre either appeal to the impoverished terminology of ordinary talk about sounds (that quality of a
sound we describe as ‘‘bright’’ or ‘‘dull,’’ ‘‘harsh’’ or ‘‘mellow,’’…), or directly state the Helmholtz theory
articulated in Sect. 2.3.
2 For instance, Hardin (1988) argues that, because no physical correlates of color exhibit the similarities
that obtain between colors, we should be color eliminativists. In contrast, Churchland (2007) attempts to
derive color similarities from surface spectral reflectance, arguing that success would constitute an
‘‘answer to [the] color realist’s prayer’’ (133).
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physicalist reduction; constancy in timbre attribution counts as evidence in favor of
some correlates over others; similarities between timbres need to be explained or
explained away.
Despite the analogous structure in physicalist debates on color and timbre, I
argue that the most popular candidate for a physicalist reduction of timbre, the
component vibrations of distal resonant events, is disanalogous with surface spectral
reflectance. In particular, a robust basis for the physicalist reduction of some set of
qualities should satisfy two constraints: first, it should be exhaustive, reducing all
the qualities in the set; second, it should form a natural category by the lights of our
best science. Though strict, these constraints appear to be met for the reduction of
color to surface spectral reflectance: the space of all surface reflectances is a
scientifically well-defined natural category, and it provides a reduction basis for all
possible surface colors. In contrast, I demonstrate that these two constraints cannot
be simultaneously satisfied for a reduction of timbre to the component vibrations of
a resonant event. The well-defined natural category of mechanical vibrations is not
adequate to reduce all timbres, but an enlarged reduction basis is no longer well-
defined or scientifically legitimate as a kind. An alternative candidate for timbre
physicalism, the spectral composition of a sound wave, fairs better as a basis for
reduction, but fails to satisfy the demand that the similarities between timbres be
adequately explained.
I begin with an introduction to the basic science of timbre, before surveying
the major philosophical theories of timbre. The key question for the would-be
timbre physicalist is: what is the bearer of timbre? It is the properties of this
bearer that suggest themselves as candidates for identifying or reducing timbre.
This leads to a detailed analysis of the prospects for reducing timbre to the
resonant interactions that compose an audible event, the most prominent current
candidate for the bearer of timbre. Either these interactions are limited to the
well-defined class of mechanical vibrations, in which case they do not subvene
all possible timbres, or they are grouped with other resonant features of the event
that together might exhaustively subvene timbre, but no longer form a
scientifically well-defined kind. The general moral of this discussion is that
prospective timbre physicalists have yet to provide an adequate reduction basis
for timbre. I conclude with some reflections on the prospects for a reductive
approach to timbre, suggesting that a non-reductive, ecological realism may be
more promising.
2 Introducing timbre
This section introduces the features of timbre science relevant to the timbre
physicalism debate. After a discussion of the timbre stimulus, I examine one method
for studying the experience of timbre, and how it might produce a ‘‘timbre solid’’
analogous to the color solid. Finally, I introduce the two main scientific theories of
timbre, which identify different external correlates as the targets for the scientific
study of timbre.
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2.1 The timbre stimulus
Timbre is typically studied as a property of complex sound stimuli. The simplest
sound stimulus is a sine wave, which can be described by three parameters:
frequency, amplitude, and duration. Complex sound stimuli are just complex waves.
Fourier’s Theorem states that any complex wave homogeneous in time may be
exhaustively described as a combination of sine waves at different relative
frequencies, amplitudes, and phases; the pattern of simple frequencies in a complex
wave is its spectral composition, and may be derived by means of a Fourier
transformation. One of these sine waves, typically the lowest, provides the
fundamental frequency, responsible for the pitch at which the sound is perceived.
The other sine waves are the overtones—in a musical context these typically stand
in whole number ratios to the fundamental frequency and are called harmonics.
Finally, realistic stimuli will change in spectral composition over time, so a
complete description requires not just a Fourier transformation of a time slice of the
stimulus into component sine waves, but an assignment of a dynamic envelope, or
description of changing relative amplitude as a function of time, to each wave.
The mathematics of Fourier analysis ensures that sound stimuli in any
experimental context may be rigorously described. Even when the stimuli are
derived from recordings of natural sources, for instance musical instruments or the
human voice, spectral analysis allows a complete description and precise
comparison of their properties. This mathematical analysis does not, however,
deliver a prediction about how the stimulus will sound. Given two complex waves,
will they sound similar or different? The degree of similarity in our experience of
timbres may not correspond to any similarity between the stimuli that is easily
definable in mathematical or physical terms. Just as surface reflectance profiles that
are quite different may be perceived as identical in color, i.e. as metamers, it is
prima facie possible that waves that are physically quite different may be perceived
as similar in timbre.
2.2 Timbre experience
Psychophysics provides methods for empirically determining the perceived
similarity relations between stimuli. There are many experimental methods for
obtaining data from which a measure of such similarities may be derived: the
subject might be asked if they can discriminate between two stimuli, to assign a
number to the degree of perceived similarity between stimuli, or to order a set of
stimuli by relative similarity or difference. This data may then be arranged into a
quality space, which plots possible sensations as points, and degrees of (dis)sim-
ilarity between these as distances within the space. In the case of color, the quality
space derived from studies such as these is familiar as the color solid, which
represents in three dimensions the relative degrees of similarity between colors. Can
the same techniques be used to derive a timbre solid?
One reason to expect that they should is that we clearly make consistent
judgments of timbre (dis)similarity. In fact, timbre typically trumps all other
attributes when it comes to categorizing sounds—two knocks against wood, two
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buzzes from different insects, two notes played on a violin: in each case, the pair is
judged similar despite differences in pitch, loudness, or duration.3 Nevertheless,
there is a major stumbling block in the search for a timbre solid, namely we do not
have any antecedent folk theory, or specialized vocabulary, for describing timbres.
Correspondingly, we have no pre-scientific theory of the basic features that organize
our experience of timbre, i.e. we do not know the grounds on which timbre
comparisons are made. This has motivated the use of multidimensional scaling in
the study of timbre similarities. Multidimensional scaling is an algorithmic
procedure for extracting a low-dimensional model from high-dimensional data. A
set of similarity judgments between n stimuli may always be represented (up to
monotonicity) in an ðn 1Þ-dimensional space, as this means that each point may
be arranged at any distance whatsoever from the remaining n 1. From this high-
dimensional representation, multidimensional scaling extracts a low-dimensional
model, the dimensions of which correspond to the underlying factors that account
for judgments of similarity. To see how this works, let’s look at an example.
An early, influential analysis of musical timbre similarities into a low-
dimensional timbre space was performed by Grey (1977).4 Grey took recordings
of common musical instruments and normalized them for loudness, duration, and
pitch. He played these recordings in pairs to 20 subjects, asking them to rate the
degree of (dis)similarity between each on a 30 point scale. Since there were 16
stimuli, these judgments could be represented in a 15-dimensional space for each
subject. Grey then used multidimensional scaling to generate a low-dimensional
geometric representation of the relative similarity distances, on the assumption that
the same underlying features of timbre were responsible for all subjects’ similarity
judgments (Fig. 1).5 Blocks in this space stand for perceived timbre qualities and
are labeled by names of the instruments from which the corresponding stimuli were
generated—BN for bassoon, FH for French horn, TM for trombone, TP for trumpet,
FL for flute, EH for English horn, C’s for clarinets, O’s for oboes, S’s for strings,
and X’s for saxophones. Lines connecting the blocks are the result of a separate
analysis of the data using a hierarchical clustering algorithm.
How is Grey’s timbre space to be interpreted? If it is to serve as a quality space,
we’d like an understanding of its axes in terms of perceptual attributes of timbre—
in the case of the color solid, for instance, axes correspond to the perceptual
qualities of hue, saturation, and lightness, or to red–green, blue–yellow, and white–
3 In fact, Wolpert (1990) demonstrates that non-musicians judge different melodies played on the same
instrument to be more similar than the same melody played on different instruments (in contrast to trained
musicians).
4 More recent surveys in this research program confirm Grey’s basic results, for instance McAdams et al.
(1995), or Howard and Angus (2009), Section 5.3.2. For a general defense and discussion of
multidimensional scaling as a method for studying timbre, see Plomp (1976, Chap. 6).
5 In particular, he used the INDSCAL algorithm of Carroll and Chang (1970), which treats the individual
differences of subjects as different weights on the axes of a common ‘‘psychological space.’’ One feature
of this algorithm (as opposed to other methods for the dimension reduction of similarity data) is that the
space cannot be arbitrarily rotated (say, to search for more intuitively ‘‘meaningful’’ axes). This motivates
the discussion in the text of the significance of these particular axes—axes that are largely confirmed by
subsequent studies of musical timbre perception.
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black axes of perceived color opposition.6 Without any antecedent expectations
about the relevant attributes of timbre experience, however, Grey must begin his
analysis by looking for qualities of the stimulus captured by each dimension. This at
least is possible as Grey’s stimuli may be precisely described in terms of their
spectral compositions. We might then attempt to reinterpret these physical
descriptions in perceptual terms. For instance, axis I correlates with both the width
of the sound’s spectral energy distribution and its center of mass. Narrow bandwidth
and low frequency are at the top (the low, muted sounds of the French horn and the
double bass), while wide bandwidth is at the bottom (the trombone’s tendency to
produce a very broad spectrum of overtones, both low and quite high, at the same
time). Does this stimuli-defined attribute correspond to a perceptual one? A likely
candidate is ‘‘brightness,’’ one of the most consistently identified perceptual
Fig. 1 Timbre space derived from subject similarity judgments by means of multidimensional scaling
(reproduced from Grey 1977, with the permission of the Acoustical Society of America)
6 More generally, since a quality space is a model of perceptual experience, it is organized by perceptual
attributes; in some representations these may not correspond directly to the axes of the space, but should
be recoverable through rotation or some simple transformation. In the case of color, only some models
exhibit a direct correspondence between axes and intuitive perceptual qualities, for instance those devised
to capture psychological features of color such as the Swedish Natural Color System. Color solids derived
directly from psychophysical data, such as CIELAB, or motivated by technological concerns, such as the
CMYK space, may be defined for convenience by axes that do not correspond directly to psychologically
salient qualities, but they exhibit the same gross structure as the NCS in virtue of preserving the same
similarity relations. (See Kuehni and Schwarz 2008, for a survey of color solids and their properties.)
Isaac (2014) argues at length for the importance of characterizing perceptual attributes in psychological
terms, distinct from the physical attributes of the stimulus.
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attributes of timbre across a wide array of different studies (e.g. Alluri and
Toiviainen 2010; Pressnitzer et al. 2015).
The other two axes are much more mysterious. Grey identifies axis II with the
synchronicity of the dynamics across the high end of the spectral distribution—
harmonics of the woodwinds enter and exit the sound together, while in the strings
and flute, harmonics fade in and out over the course of the sound at very different
rates. Axis III captures something about the inharmonicity in the sound’s attack
(i.e. the onset of its volume envelope)—at one extreme, the trombone and some
saxophones exhibit high-end ‘‘noise’’ during attack, while at the other, the double
bass, cello, and clarinets exhibit low-end inharmonic grumbling during attack.
These attempts at describing the regularities in the spectral composition of stimuli
that track axes II and III are quite rough; moreover, there are no obvious perceptual
attributes to which they correspond. Subsequent work has improved the precision
with which the regularities in the stimulus that motivate timbre judgments may be
described, but the identification of these with intuitive timbre qualities continues to
be tentative (e.g. Howard and Angus 2009, esp. 250–2).
So, studies in the psychophysics of timbre are not yet adequate to play as rich a
role in the timbre realism debate as the color solid plays in the color realism debate.
Nevertheless, even without a complete account of the primitive features of timbre,
studies such as Grey’s provide evidence about the similarities between timbres that
must be explained (or explained away) by an adequate physicalist theory of timbre.
Indeed, one route to advance our science of the experience of timbre is to refine our
hypotheses about the correlates of timbre in the stimulus. Perhaps it is difficult to
see intuitive patterns in a timbre solid such as Grey’s because a description of the
stimuli in terms of spectral composition does not correctly characterize that aspect
of the sound signal that our timbre experience detects and encodes. To draw another
analogy with color: once we hypothesize that color experience detects surface
reflectance properties (as opposed, say, to the spectral composition of light waves
incident at the retina), we can use descriptions of stimuli in terms of surface
reflectance to describe our psychophysical data and regularities in surface
reflectance to motivate the design of new experiments (as, for instance, in the
case of asymmetrical matching experiments). What then are the prominent scientific
theories of the external correlates of timbre experience?
2.3 Two theories of timbre
Arguably, the scientific study of timbre begins with Hermann von Helmholtz’s On
the Sensations of Tone (1885). Helmholtz’s investigation of sound and how we
experience it integrated methods and theories from acoustics, psychoacoustics, and
auditory physiology. To the already established view that sounds are waves in a
medium, he added two key ingredients upheld in most subsequent scientific
discourse: perceived sound is the proximal wave at the ear, and timbre is a property
of this proximal wave. However, there are phenomenological reasons to doubt this
story. Our auditory experience is not of sounds as mere proximal disturbances: we
appear to hear distal events (I can hear the construction outside my window, for
instance), and we experience sounds as maintaining identity while traveling through
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a medium (I hear my neighbor’s TV through the wall). Even more compelling is the
corresponding epistemic intuition: we learn about distal events through their sounds.
The insight that sounds convey information about the environment suggests a
conception of timbre as a property of distal events, not of sounds per se; this view
forms the basis for an alternative approach to the scientific study of timbre
advocated by J. J. Gibson (1966). The remainder of this section elaborates these two
scientific views in more detail before we turn to philosophical theories of timbre.
Helmholtz (1885) is responsible for initiating the characterization of the sound
stimulus articulated in Sect. 2.1. He explicitly employs Fourier’s Theorem to
mathematically describe the sound stimulus incident at the ear. For Helmholtz, a
first pass theory of timbre7 identifies it with the overtones of the sound stimulus,
i.e. the pattern of component waves that accompany the fundamental frequency. On
this view, there is a continuity between timbre and chord, a continuity Helmholtz
believed to be supported by psychophysical evidence—if one listens carefully to a
single note struck on the piano, for instance, it will resolve itself into its component
frequencies, and be perceived no longer as an isolated tone, but as a chord.
Furthermore, this psychophysical theory conformed with Helmholtz’s physiological
theory of hearing, on which the frequency of each component of a complex wave
excites a different position along the length of the cochlea, and the nerve fibre
excited at that location determines the pitch component heard (the so-called ‘‘place
theory’’ of sound perception). On this view, the ear essentially performs a Fourier
transform on the incoming sound wave, and thus it seems natural to identify the
timbral quality of the sound with the pattern of simpler waves derived through this
process.
Helmholtz himself was already aware of inadequacies in this theory. Most
obviously, the Fourier transformation is defined over a standing wave, which is
homogeneous in time. Yet we rarely perceive such homogeneous sounds—the more
typical cases are sounds which change dynamically in time, with harmonic
components growing softer or louder over the course of the sound’s duration. The
natural extension of Helmholtz’s view is to take timbre to be some function of the
spectral components of the incident wave and their dynamics. Since Fourier’s
Theorem ensures that all possible sound stimuli may be described in terms of their
component waves, this view has the advantage of ensuring that it covers all possible
timbres, even if the function from the spectral composition of waves to timbres is
unknown. It is perhaps for this reason that an updated Helmholtzian view along
these lines appears typical amongst acousticians and psychophysicists.
Gibson (1966) accepts the general view of sounds as disturbances in a medium,
but he emphasizes the informational content of these disturbances. What we learn
about first and foremost on hearing a sound is not the proximal state of the medium,
7 The German term is Klangfarbe, literally tone or sound ‘‘color’’—etymologically encoding the
analogies between timbre and color highlighted in the text. Despite the recommendation of colleagues,
Helmholtz’s translator Ellis refused to render this as ‘‘timbre,’’ since it ‘‘is a foreign word, often odiously
mispronounced, and not worth preserving’’ (24), preferring instead ‘‘tone quality.’’ Nevertheless,
‘‘timbre’’ has survived as a technical term in both musicology and psychology, and is the standard modern
translation of Klangfarbe.
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but the distal source of the sound. In line with his general ecological perspective,
Gibson argues that the timbre categories we hear should be identified with distal
event types of importance to the organism on an evolutionary timescale. During
sufficiently long periods of our evolutionary history, for instance, the distinctive
timbral features of the snapping of twigs or the growl of a tiger allowed us to
identify an event of interest (the presence of a predator) and its spatiotemporal
location. Selection pressures instilled in us the perceptual power to directly detect
these relevant mechanical disturbances as timbral categories.
Gibson’s view has been influential, yet remains a minority position in the science
of perception. One issue for the study of timbre in particular is that the Gibsonian
tradition has yet to develop a comprehensive taxonomy of timbre in ecological
terms. Consequently, even studies in ecological psychoacoustics (e.g. Neuhoff
2004) employ the apparatus of Helmholtz (Fourier analysis, spectral decomposition)
when a precise characterization of the stimulus is required. Nevertheless, a lingering
motivation for Gibson’s approach, and one that has resulted in the basic ideas being
rediscovered or remotivated many times, not least by recent philosophy of sound, is
the phenomenological plausibility of its ontology: we don’t experience sound
qualities as occurring proximally at the ear, but as properties of distal events or
objects.
3 What has timbre?
With the science of timbre under our belts, we can turn to the philosophy of timbre.
If we are to seek a physicalist reduction of timbre, we must first ask what sorts of
entities are the bearers of timbre. The general metaphysics of sound may influence
our answer to this question; if sounds are the bearers of timbre, than our ontology of
timbre will depend on our ontology of sound. Nevertheless, it is conceptually
possible that sounds themselves are not the bearers of timbre, and thus that our
ontologies of sound and of timbre come apart. Gibson’s view takes this form:
sounds are disturbances in a medium, but timbres are not properties of these
disturbances, rather they are properties of sound sources.
Since the ultimate target of our discussion is timbre physicalism, I will not canvas
the host of possible subjectivist, or anti-realist theories of timbre. Just as in the case
of color, for instance, one might be eliminativist, arguing there are no actual timbre
qualities in the world, and that our attributions of timbre are in widespread error; or
one might be dispositionalist, arguing timbres are dispositions in external objects or
events to cause particular sensations in us. For an extended argument against anti-
realist theories of sound and its qualities, see O’Callaghan (2007).
Considering only realist accounts compatible with physicalism, there are three
broad candidates for the bearers of timbre: waves, material objects, and resonant
events. Each potential bearer of timbre suggests a particular objective physical
quality to which timbre might be reduced: for waves, the spectral composition; for
objects, the disposition to resonate; and for resonant events, the component
mechanical interactions. I consider each of these candidate bearers of timbre in turn,
surveying briefly the arguments for and against. The most popular position appears
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to be that timbres are properties of resonant events or processes, in part because
similarities between timbres are purportedly better explained by similarities
between resonant events than by similarities between waves. Nevertheless, I will
question the plausibility of this argument, suggesting some potential
counterexamples.
3.1 Waves
Are soundwaves, or disturbances in a medium, the bearers of timbre? If one accepts
that sounds are themselves waves in a medium, and that timbre is a property of
sounds, then the answer will be yes. I take there to be two main objections to this
position.8 The first identifies an apparent incompatibility between our attributions of
stable location to sounds and the view that they are traveling waves. A second line
of critique turns on the explanation of timbre constancy: no known similarities
between the spectral compositions of waves predict our attributions of timbre
constancy and similarity. Examining these objections in turn will motivate the
possibility that distal objects or events are the bearers of timbre.
Before turning to criticisms of the view that timbre is borne by waves, it is worth
briefly stressing its advantages. This is the view that conforms most closely with
mainstream scientific practice. Furthermore, the trajectory of research originating
with Helmholtz suggests a natural reduction basis for timbre: the spectral
composition of the wave and its dynamics. From Fourier’s Theorem, we know
the spectral composition is well defined, and have strong reason to think it will be
adequate to reduce all possible timbres. More generally, if our perceptual experience
of timbre is determined entirely by the incident wave, we know that it may be
characterized by some function of this wave, if not that suggested by Fourier per se.9
Thus, it looks as if the two criteria for an adequate reduction, that the basis be a
scientifically well-defined category, and that it exhaustively reduce all the relevant
qualities, will be easily satisfied.
Pasnau (1999) acknowledges the wave view as both the scientific standard and
the view most clearly captured in ordinary discourse about sound. Nevertheless, he
argues that both our scientific and folk theories of sound exhibit ‘‘incoherence’’ in
their attribution of locations to sounds. If sounds are disturbances in a medium, they
should be everywhere, filling the surrounding air. Yet we easily locate sounds in
space, at their sources—the bird chirped over there; the thud of the jackhammer is
outside my office. Cases where we locate sounds throughout space—his harsh
laughter filled the room—are atypical and illusory, ‘‘analogous to seeing colours in a
hall of mirrors’’ (312). Consequently, in order to avoid widespread error in our
apparent perception of sound locations, Pasnau advocates abandoning the wave
view of sound and treating sounds as properties of sources, much like colors.
Pasnau’s argument seems to apply mutatis mutandis to the particular quality of
8 These are not, however, the only objections to the wave view, see Casati and Dokic (1994).
9 See for instance Palmieri (2012) for a discussion of the possibility that some function other than the
Fourier transformation may best describe the relation between stimulus and the experience of sound.
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timbre. We typically localize timbres like chirping or thudding, and only in rare,
confusing cases do we perceive timbres as nonlocalized and filling space (e.g. the
disorienting omnipresence of the oscillating hum of cicadas on a summer’s night).
While Pasnau’s claim that we are typically able to localize sound sources is
incontrovertible, his phenomenological assertion that we do not experience sounds
as traveling through a medium seems suspect. He insists ‘‘Sounds that were caused
at a distance seem to be at a distance; they do not seem to be coming towards you,
unless that which makes the sound is in fact coming towards you’’ (311). Yet it
seems to me that the expressions we use to describe sounds traveling while sources
remain stationary have phenomenal content: a guitar sounds different if it ‘‘washes
over you,’’ ‘‘fills the room,’’ or is heard ‘‘through the wall’’; likewise, words may be
‘‘blown away’’ by the wind, ‘‘lost’’ in a large hall, or ‘‘swallowed up’’ by the
surrounding din. If these phenomenal differences in perceived sonic motion are not
themselves properties of the sound, of what are they properties?
Pasnau puzzles that ‘‘if sounds are qualities of the air, then it is hard to explain
how, in virtue of hearing those sounds, we also manage to hear the objects that make
the sounds’’ (317–8). Yet this is no puzzle at all if the qualities of the air at issue
bear directional and timbral information. This consideration appears to motivate
defences of the wave view against the location problem. For instance, Sorensen
(2008) points out that if we did experience sounds as expanding spheres of
disturbance in a medium, i.e. as waves, pragmatic considerations would dictate that
we locate sounds at their source—the center is the most informative point for
locating a sphere (282f). O’Shaughnessy (2009) argues that sounds bear directional
information, and thus allow us to locate their sources, but are not themselves at their
sources. Tellingly, for him, the properties of sounds and their sources may be
different, for instance, in duration—a short vibratory event, say a knock on wood,
may produce a longer sound, for instance in a large auditorium, where it may
reverberate.
Nudds (2009, 2010) is an advocate of the wave view who explicitly identifies
timbres as properties of waves. He argues that our ability to detect and localize
sound sources depends on the auditory system’s capacity to analyze and group by
plausible source the component frequencies in a complex soundwave incident at the
ear. Since the relationship between sound sources and the patterns of frequencies
they produce is lawlike, the auditory system can take advantage of regularities in the
proximal soundwave to extract locational and categorical information about the
source. Since the goal of this process is to provide information about sound sources,
we can only make sense of it, and the regularities it exploits, by appealing to sources
and their properties. Thus, this view has it that sounds are waves, timbres are
properties of these waves, yet timbre categories can only be explained by appealing
to the physical properties of distal sound sources.
One might think, however, that the failure of the wave view to explain timbre
categories is evidence that timbres are not themselves properties of waves. This
consideration motivates a second prominent argument against the wave view, which
stresses the claim that the spectral composition of waves does not adequately
explain the constancy in our attributions of timbre or its similarities. Anecdotally,
we perceive timbre to remain constant across changes in the source that affect the
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acoustic properties of the signal, i.e. its spectral composition. The soundwaves from
a violin played in the same room as the listener, from one played down the hall, and
from one played outside the window will be quite different in spectral composition,
yet we perceive them as ‘‘the same,’’ or at least very similar, in timbre. What is the
feature of the waveforms that is the same in this case? We as yet have no explicit
account of what this could be. O’Callaghan (2007), for instance, cites the authority
of Handel (1995) on this, who insists that ‘‘no known acoustic invariants can be said
to underlie timbre’’ (89). Likewise, O’Callaghan and Nudds (2009) argue ‘‘[t]here
are good reasons to doubt’’ that sounds ‘‘are determined by underlying acoustic
features’’ (20):
Neither the sound of a car driving on a gravel road, nor the sound of wood
striking wood, for example, corresponds to a simple or straightforward feature
recognizable on the surface of the acoustic signal. Each is highly complex and
probably requires mentioning features of its source to make its individuation
intelligible. (20)
The fact that we can’t point to any systematic, or invariant, feature of a waveform
that specifies its timbre plausibly counts against the identification of timbres with
spectral composition.
These two lines of criticism against the wave view of sounds and timbres have
motivated two prominent categories of alternative view. The location worries of
Pasnau (1999) motivated him to identify sounds (a fortiori timbres) with properties
of objects, since the locations of objects better explain our localization of sounds.
The constancy worries of O’Callaghan (and many others) motivate the view that
timbres are properties of resonant processes or events, as invariants in these events
better explain the constancy in our attributions of timbre. Let’s address these views
in turn.
3.2 Objects
Although Pasnau (1999) instigates the view that sounds are properties of objects, he
later repudiates it, endorsing a version of the event view addressed in the next
section (Pasnau 2009). Nevertheless, the basic idea has been developed and
defended by Kulvicki (2008, 2014). Pasnau’s original, cautious view was that
‘‘sounds either are the vibrations of …objects, or supervene on those vibrations’’
(1999, 316). Kulvicki defends the more extreme position that sounds are
stable dispositions of objects to vibrate (e.g. when struck). In many respects, the
stable dispositions view seems even more plausible for timbres than for sounds
themselves—we naturally discuss the timbre of a violin as if it is a stable property of
the instrument, revealed when it is played, but persisting even when it is silent.
Nevertheless, several facts about timbre individuation speak strongly against this
view: timbres depend for their identity on changes in the sound over time; the same
object may emit sounds of radically different timbres; and timbres may be
determined by interactions between multiple objects. These considerations appear to
invalidate stable dispositions of objects as eligible candidates for the physical
reduction of timbre.
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Kulvicki’s stable dispositions view is motivated by analogies with color. Just as
we learn about properties of an object (its color) when light bounces off it, Kulvicki
argues we learn about the properties of an object (its sound) when it is struck or
otherwise mechanically disturbed. What are the properties we learn about when an
object is struck? Kulvicki emphasizes the natural modes of vibration of a resonant
object. If one flicks a number of different wine glasses, they tinkle at different
pitches—this is because the physical structure of each wine glass permits it to
vibrate easily at some frequencies, but not at others. The modes or patterns of
vibration at which an object easily vibrates are indeed a stable, dispositional
property of the object, and they matter for the sounds that object produces when
struck, rubbed, or otherwise disrupted—this is why the exact shape of a violin
matters for the sound it produces.
Yet there is more to the sound that comes from an object when it is stimulated
than just ‘‘its natural frequencies of vibration in their ordinary proportions with
respect to one another’’ (2008, 5). The natural frequencies of vibration enter and exit
prolonged sounds coming from an object at different times; they ramp up with the
attack of the sound, and ramp down with its decay. Kulvicki argues that this pattern
of attack and decay should also be understood as a stable disposition of the object,
since it is determined by the object’s physical structure (7). A purported virtue of
this enriched view is its ability to explain the constancy in our individuation of
object sounds: why does a violin sound the same whether played in the room with
me or down the hall? Because the stable disposition of the violin to resonant in a
certain dynamic pattern (for Kulvicki: its sound) stays the same.
While Kulvicki pushes the stable disposition view as a theory of the ontology of
sound, it may at first appear even more appealing as an ontology of timbre. Many of
the examples he discusses, for instance our talk of the ‘‘sound’’ of a bell or the
‘‘sound’’ of a violin, are most naturally understood as metonymic for the timbre of
the bell or violin. We don’t intend to refer to any particular pitch, loudness, or
duration when we refer to the ‘‘sound’’ of a musical instrument, but rather to its
sound quality, or timbre. If timbres are properties of objects, then Kulvicki’s
stable disposition view is the most promising candidate for their physicalist basis:
the natural modes of vibration, and the natural pattern of attack and decay of these,
determined by the physical structure of the object. Nevertheless, the stable properties
of objects are not a rich enough basis for the correct individuation of the full array of
possible timbre categories and their similarities.
One problem is that timbre identity is constitutively tied to changes in a sound
over time. Kulvicki thinks he can account for this by appealing to the natural pattern
of attack and decay determined by the object’s structure. A problem with this
solution, however, is that the same physically determined attack, decay, and
overtones may contribute to quite different timbres. Consider, for instance, how the
sound of a violin changes with the pressure with which it is bowed, or the sound of a
trumpet changes with changes in the tightness of the lips as it is blown. In these
cases, the natural modes of resonance determine the harmonics in the sound, the
natural patterns of attack and decay determine how the resonant frequencies enter
and exit the sound, yet still the sounds produced are in some sense different. Since
the various violin notes or trumpet notes may be identical in loudness, pitch, and
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duration, timbre is the critical factor that distinguishes them.10 One way to make
sense of the difference here is that, despite rough similarity in the pattern of attack
and decay, the exact timing at which harmonics enter and exit the sound, and their
exact relative strengths, differ for the various notes. The stable dispositions view
seems to have no resources to account for this difference, as the stable dispositions
of the object have not changed at all, while the timbre of the sounds it produces has.
This example is really just a special case of the more general point that the same
object may produce a wide variety of timbres: a violin’s strings may be bowed or
plucked; its body may be tapped against or knocked; the palm of the hand may be
dragged against its back to produce a loud squeak; it may be struck against a wall
and shattered. Even if it is true that all these sounds share some component
determined by the stable dispositions of the violin, they also differ in some way, and
insofar as these differences are differences of timbre, then the stable properties of
the violin do not explain them. In fact, I think examples such as this reveal just how
heavily the stable dispositions view relies on musical examples for its plausibility;
when we speak casually of the sound or timbre of a violin, the kind of consideration
that motivates Kulvicki, it is really shorthand for the sound or timbre of a violin
played in the usual manner—without reference to our usual mode of interaction
with the object, a reference implicit in musical instrument examples, there is no way
to identify the timbre of the object.11
A yet more general issue here is that timbres are typically determined by
interactions between more than one object. For Kulvicki, the paradigmatic case is a
short, sharp ‘‘thwack,’’ such that the thwacked object has the timbre, and the
thwacking one merely reveals it. It is not clear how his view should extend to sound
producing interactions that are radically different from thwacks, however. Consider
the sound of a saw against a log: the distinct timbre of sawing is not obviously a
10 One might think that increased pressure while playing the violin results in an increase in loudness, but
this is not necessarily the case. Increased pressure from the bow creates greater friction with the string,
impeding its movement. A slower bow at greater pressure may produce a note at the same loudness as a
faster, lighter bow movement, yet the two will sound different. In the case of trumpets and other wind
instruments, the sound is determined in part by the ‘‘embouchure’’ or tightness and shape of the lips while
playing. Changes in embouchure can produce changes in pitch or loudness, as for instance on a bugle,
where all such changes are so produced, but they may also produce differences of tone or sound quality
while pitch and loudness remain stable. Examples such as these, where a change in performance
technique produces a discernible change in timbre, but no change in pitch, loudness, or duration, are easy
to find for any musical instrument (the only exception are those rare instruments where timbre is
mechanically inaccessible to performer technique, e.g. a pipe organ).
11 c.f. Davies (2010), who argues that timbres are properties of musical instruments, but depend
constitutively on the characteristic manner in which the instrument is played. Kulvicki himself has the
resources to rescue his ontology of sound from these apparent counterexamples by abandoning the view
that timbres are properties of sounds. For instance, Kulvicki (2014) defends the stable dispositions view
from the accusation that sounds are individuated by durations by arguing that the phenomenal evidence is
consistent with the claim that it is not sounds, but ‘‘merely the episodes in which sounds can be heard
[that] have durations’’ (210). Kulvicki might likewise insist that it is not sounds themselves, but episodes
in which sounds are heard that have timbres. Here, again, the ontologies of sound and of timbre would
come apart; in this case, sounds would be properties of objects, but timbres would be properties of the
resonant mechanical interactions that reveal those sounds—essentially the view discussed in the
following section. (It is not clear to me that this defense will work for the example in the following
paragraph, however.)
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consequence of the resonant features of either the log or the saw. The closest
example to this kind of interaction discussed by Kulvicki is that of a glass shattering
against a stone floor, of which the stable dispositions view might say ‘‘the vibratory
dispositions of the objects in question are changing quite quickly’’ (2014, 212). But
this kind of explanation won’t work for the sound of sawing—the stable resonant
dispositions of the saw and the log are pretty much the same before and after
sawing; they sound the same when thwacked. Yet the sound of the sawing itself
does not appear to involve, or depend at all, on these vibratory dispositions, but
rather on the nature of the mechanical interaction between the teeth of the saw and a
resistant solid.
These considerations all point to the conclusion that an analysis of timbres as
stable dispositions of objects to resonate is untenable. In particular, a key criterion
for an adequate theory of timbre, the correct individuation of timbre categories and
their similarities, is not fulfilled. The counterexamples above suggest a more
promising alternative: timbres are not properties of objects, but of resonant events or
processes in which the objects participate. The same object (e.g. a violin) produces
different timbres when it participates in different events or processes; likewise it
produces similar timbres when it participates in similar events. The distinctive
timbre of sawing is not a property of either the saw or the log, but of the mechanical
interaction between them. Views such as this have come to dominate recent
philosophy of sound.
3.3 Events
Worries about how sounds are individuated and located have driven many
philosophers to the view that sounds are to be found in the vicinity of distal resonant
events (e.g. Casati and Dokic 1994, 2009; O’Callaghan 2007, 2009; Roden 2010;
Matthen 2010; Kubovy and Schutz 2010). Even once one has honed in on events as
the general locus for an ontology of sound, there are a host of further metaphysical
questions one might ask: are sounds events themselves, parts of events, or do they
supervene on events? Must resonant events disturb a medium to subvene sound, or
may sounds occur in a vacuum? How should we conceptualize events: as bounded
spatiotemporal regions, as processes or mechanisms, as particulars or universals?
Since our focus is on timbre physicalism, I think it safe to abstract away from most
of these disagreements. Once one identifies timbres with properties of audible
events, the natural bases for a physical reduction of timbre are the vibrating
processes and resonating interactions that contribute to the production of sound.
The view that timbres are properties of events is very close to that of Gibson, and
it is somewhat surprising that recent philosophy of sound has not made much
contact with his work or ecological theories of audition.12 One reason may just be
that Gibson himself identifies sound with the ensuing wave, not the event (see,
e.g. Casati and Dokic 1994, 15). Nevertheless, the basic insight behind Gibson’s
12 Gritten (2012) bemoans the lack of attention to Gibson in this literature, advocating for more
engagement with his conceptual framework (a prominent exception is Kubovy and Schutz 2010;
c.f. Davies 2010).
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project, that invariant aspects of auditory experience are best explained by
invariants in the sound source, does appear to be rediscovered in these views. A
second reason that event theories of sound have not engaged Gibson may perhaps be
his resolute anti-physicalism. While Gibson advocated direct realism—we directly
access distal objects and events in perception—he insisted that the ecological
environment we so perceive could not be reduced in any interesting way to its
physical properties (Gibson 1986). Nevertheless, many event theories of sound are
explicitly presented as ‘‘physicalist.’’
The Gibsonian point that invariant features of sound sources best explain the
constancy in our attributions of timbres and their similarities has been offered as a
major argument in favor of the event view. Recall the worry that the wave view
could not explain similarities in our perception of timbre, as no known similarities
between waves predict similarities in perceived timbres. In contrast, an event view
may do better on this score, if similarities between events do successfully predict
timbre categories. Plausibly, the events involved in playing two different notes on a
violin, or of playing a note on a violin and one on a cello, comprise quite similar
vibratory processes and resonant interactions. This similarity in event type may then
explain the similarity in the corresponding timbres. A representative argument is
that of O’Callaghan (2007): ‘‘timbre quality …depends …upon features of the
source and the characteristic manner in which it disturbs a medium’’ because ‘‘[t]hat
is …what remains constant across changes to its determinate audible qualities. The
uniformity of timbre across sounds and circumstances is best explained by
constancy in factors beyond the attributes of waves’’ (89).
A closely related, but somewhat more nuanced position is expressed by Roden
(2010), for whom timbres are ‘‘variable sets of physical features’’ of a ‘‘sound
generation mechanism’’ (145). He takes our ability to discriminate timbres as
evidence for some flavor of timbre realism, but presents his view as ‘‘a more modest
physicalism’’ than O’Callaghan’s (144). Roden is motivated by results such as those
discussed in Sect. 2.2, namely that the underlying factors determining our timbral
judgments, when described in terms of wave properties, may be quite complex. He
worries that this complexity may resist reduction to any simple property of the
audible event. Thus, while ‘‘[i]n traditional musical contexts we distinguish timbres
in terms of typical mechanisms of sound generation’’ (144–5), timbre categories in
general may not correlate with any simply definable mechanical quality.
Timbral discrimination, then, does not plausibly ‘track’ a single type of
physical feature …but relatively idiomatic patterns of relations between such
features. This is consistent with a qualified interpretation of timbral kinds as
consisting of recurrent constellations of features of sound generation
processes, but it need not entail an essential limit on what kinds of
relationships between more basic physical features can be picked out through
identification of timbres. This seems plausible given that we normally use
timbre to track complex processes such as the crying of babies (or cats), the
percussion of hail on corrugated iron, or the motion of a fan blade in an
extractor—not basic physical properties. (145)
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So, the prospective timbre physicalism of the event view may be characterized in
strong terms—timbres reduce to characteristic forms of mechanical disturbance—or
in much weaker terms—timbres ‘‘track …idiomatic patterns’’ of such physical
features. But are these arguments correct? Do invariant features of sound sources or
events in fact do well at individuating timbre categories? There are many anecdotal
reasons to doubt this claim. While the connection between sound source and timbre
may be more intuitively robust than that between waveform and timbre, there are
nevertheless mysteries about its exact instantiation.
If timbre is really best explained by the mechanical interactions that participate in
audible events, then similarity between these interactions should be a strong
predictor of timbre similarity. In particular, if two events are very different, they
should produce different timbres, and if two events are very similar, they should
produce similar timbres. Nevertheless, there are abundant counterexamples to the
first claim, and considerations that speak against the second. For instance, there are
many examples of apparent ‘‘timbre metamers’’: sounds assessed as similar in
timbre, yet produced by radically different mechanical interactions—the phe-
nomenon of the babbling brook, for instance, where the rushing of water over stones
produces a sound similar to a room full of people engaged in conversation.
Famously, the crying of a baby, a muted trumpet, and an electric guitar played
through a ‘‘wah’’ pedal all sound very similar in timbre, yet are generated by three
very different processes. The art of foley (ex post facto recording of sound for film)
may frequently rely on using similar mechanical interactions to generate sound
effects (coconut halves for the clopping of horses’ hooves), but not always, for
instance when crinkled cellophane is used to foley the crackling of a fire.
Examples of radically different event types judged similar in timbre are found in
the musical case as well. For instance, look again at Fig. 1; notice that the flute and
violin are judged to be more similar to each other than either the violin is to other
strings or the flute to other winds. Yet there are radically different processes going
on here—the one involves the direct mechanical contact of a tense string and bow,
as resonated through a wooden frame, the other the vibration of a column of air
within a metal tube. Furthermore, arguments in favor of both object and event views
imply the timbre attributed to a musical instrument should stay relatively fixed
across changes in pitch. In fact, however, instruments that employ different sound
production mechanisms may be confused readily in some parts of their pitch range,
but not in others (Grey 1977, discusses this phenomenon with respect to confusion
between bassoon and various brass instruments).
Are there cases where similar mechanical interactions generate radically different
timbres? These are perhaps harder to find, yet there are still some prominent
examples. We are all familiar with the danger of a very slight change in the angle at
which chalk is used on a blackboard and the radical change in timbre that can occur
from a gentle scratching to a piercing screech. More generally, it is not at all clear
what features determine similarity between the mechanical processes that generate
sounds in the first place. For instance, musical instruments are typically grouped by
the gross features by which they produce sounds, but these do not always track
similarity in timbre. A piano may be categorized as ‘‘percussion’’ since it generates
sound through percussive events (hammers striking taut strings)—yet a piano
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sounds nothing like a kettledrum; likewise, a violin bow may be rubbed against a
variety of objects (a Tibetan prayer bowl, a musical saw, an electric guitar) and
generate a great diversity of timbres.
These are cases where the gross mechanical features of the event seem a poor
predictor for sound quality, while the detailed resonant features of the instrument,
and the harmonics it produces, seem a much better predictor of timbre similarity.
Yet the converse case may be found as well—simple changes to the gross features
of a sound may predict timbre judgments far better than its spectral complexity. For
instance, from both spectral and mechanical standpoints a violin and a clarinet are
radically different. Mechanically, the violin produces sound through friction
between the string and the bow, the clarinet through the vibration of a column of air
induced through the vibration of its reed. Spectrally, the violin generates all
harmonics above its fundamental at decreasing intensities, while the clarinet only
generates odd numbered harmonics (in sound synthesis terms: violins generate
‘‘sawtooth’’ waves while clarinets generate ‘‘square’’ waves). Nevertheless, if you
record a note from a clarinet and play it back by fading it gradually in, then
gradually out, it will be judged very similar to, if not outright mistaken for, a violin.
Thus, changes in volume envelope alone may radically affect our judgments of
timbre category.
These considerations do not undermine the metaphysical coherence of a view
that takes sounds to be events, and timbres properties of those events. They do,
however, undermine (if not definitively so) the argument that invariant features of
sound production mechanisms better explain constancies in our attribution of
timbre. The crucial point is just that, while it may be a legitimate worry about the
wave view that we do not have a simple theory of how to predict timbre from
surface waveform, there is an analogous worry for the event view: we may have an
intuitive grasp on the contributions made by features of events to timbre, but we do
not have a detailed theory of how to predict timbres from those features.
4 Does timbre reduce to properties of the sound event?
To review the situation so far: we began with three candidates for the physical
bearers of timbre: waves, objects, and events. The wave view takes timbres to be
properties of the proximal wave incident at the ear. This view has two prominent
advantages: it conforms to scientific practice, and Fourier’s Theorem guarantees
that all timbres may be reduced to wave properties. Nevertheless, there are two
marks against the wave view. One is the location problem: we perceive sounds, a
fortiori timbres, as distally located. The second is the similarity problem: no known
similarities between the spectral compositions of waves explain the similarities
between timbres. The object view, identifying timbres with stable dispositions to
resonate, solves the location problem, but it is demonstrably inadequate at
individuating timbres. The event view appears to solve both the location problem
and the similarity problem (modulo some worries raised in the previous section).
What are the prospects for a timbre physicalism that reduces timbres to properties of
events?
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This section explores this question in more detail. I begin by revisiting color
physicalism in order to highlight some analogies with wave timbre physicalism.
These examples will set the standard of rigor that a successful event timbre
physicalism must meet. I then discuss a plausible reduction basis for the event view:
mechanical vibrations. Nevertheless, I ultimately conclude that there is a barrier to
this reduction. In particular, sound sources dynamically interact with the surround-
ing medium. This means that there is no scientifically well-defined boundary
between a distal audible event and the wave it generates. The upshot is that there is
no legitimate scientific kind to which would-be event timbre physicalists might
successfully reduce all timbres.
4.1 Color physicalism and wave timbre
The gold standard for reductive physicalism about perceptual qualities is color
physicalism (e.g. Byrne and Hilbert 2003). Color physicalism identifies colors with
(classes of) surface spectral reflectance (SSR). Since SSR exhaustively describes the
results of all possible interactions of a surface with light, we have strong reason to
believe that it subvenes all possible (surface) color categories. These categories may
not themselves have physical significance, i.e. scientific interest independent of
their role in generating perceived color. Nevertheless, the space of all possible SSRs
is precisely defined from a physical standpoint. An SSR is a function that assigns to
each possible wavelength within a region of the electromagnetic spectrum a
percentile representing the relative degree to which that wavelength is reflected;
mathematically, this is just a function from a region of the real line to values in the
interval [0, 1]. The space of all SSRs is just the set of all such functions. While the
groupings of SSRs that correspond to color categories as we perceive them are not
of primitive physical interest, SSRs themselves, and in general, bands of energy
within this range of the electromagnetic spectrum, are objectively significant as they
reveal underlying physical properties of objects—hence the use of spectral
reflectance to analyze the elemental composition of meteorites (Gaffey 1976) or
the quantity of chlorophyll, and thus photosynthetic activity, in plants (Myneni et al.
1995).
A reduction of timbre to the properties of waves identified by Helmholtz would
have similar features. The space of all possible combinations of simple sine waves is
well-defined, although the defining functions are more complex than those for SSR.
Three numbers are needed to specify each sine wave: period, amplitude, and relative
phase. Furthermore, as noted above, sounds change dynamically in time; as such,
each sine composing a complex wave will need its own dynamic envelope—an
attack, sustain, and decay—representable by a function from a region of the real line
(length of the sound) to values in the interval [0, 1] (relative volume). Fourier’s
Theorem guarantees that this strategy is adequate to capture the complete range of
complex waves, and thus of sonic possibilities. Just as with color, it may well be that
classes of spectral composition assigned the same timbre do not have independent
physical interest—this is implied by the similarity problem. Nevertheless, the
Fourier decomposition of complex acoustic signals into their components is
scientifically important for understanding the propagation of waves through media
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entirely independent of our sense of hearing, for instance in the analysis of sonar
data to map the seafloor and determine properties of the deep sea habitat (Brown
et al. 2011).
So, both the reduction of colors to SSR and of timbres to spectral composition
share these features: the reduction basis is (i) scientifically well-defined and of
independent physical interest, and (ii) adequate to reduce all possible categories of
the perceptual quality, despite perhaps (iii) the corresponding classes within that
basis not themselves having physical significance. Features (i) and (ii) seem jointly
necessary for the adequacy of a proposed physicalist reduction. If (i) is not satisfied,
then it would seem that the reduction basis is not a legitimate physical kind.13 If (ii)
is not satisfied, then it would seem the proposed correspondence between some
perceptual qualities and their physical correlates is not truly a reduction. (Of course,
if (iii) is violated, and the perceptual qualities may be reduced to physical classes of
independent interest, so much the better.)
4.2 Vibrations?
Does the event view suggest a candidate basis for reduction that satisfies these two
conditions: it is physically well-defined, and it subvenes all possible timbres? A
plausible candidate is the set of mechanical vibrations that participate in an audible
event. Unfortunately, accepting vibrations as the reduction basis of timbre requires
abandoning an appealing feature of the event view: its solution to the similarity
problem. To see this, let’s look at the physics of musical instruments.14
Any body stiff enough to return to an initial position once displaced and
possessing of inertia such that it might overshoot, and thus fluctuate around an
equilibrium, will mechanically vibrate. Typical musical examples include bowed,
plucked, or hammered strings, the wooden bodies of stringed instruments,
drumheads, etc. Vibrating bodies, or oscillators, can be decomposed into their
characteristic ‘‘modes,’’ or independent degrees of freedom, and oscillators may be
physically linked such that they are ‘‘coupled,’’ or functionally interdependent. For
instance, the different wooden components that make up a violin may be considered
distinct vibrating bodies, but because of the complex physical interactions at their
joints, as mediated also by the vibrating air trapped inside, the violin body as a
whole exhibits complex modes of vibration.
How well do we understand the relationship between the gross mechanical events
in which instruments participate and their subsequent patterns of vibration? Not
very well. For instance, although some progress has been made (especially recently,
with the aid of computers, e.g. Bretos et al. 1999) in simulating violin body
vibrations with numerical methods, our physical understanding of a violin does not
13 Note that this does not rule out disjunctive kinds; it merely requires that the set of disjuncts of such a
kind itself be precisely definable in physical terms. The case of SSR illustrates this—a diverse set of
microphysically distinct surface interactions result in the ‘‘reflectance’’ of some, but not all, of the light
incident on a surface (for a detailed survey see Nassau 2001). Nevertheless, SSR provides a precise way
to exhaustively characterize this set through its effects on the behavior of incident light.
14 This section draws heavily on Fletcher and Rossing (1991), especially Chaps. 1 and 10.
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permit an analytic derivation of patterns of vibration from its material and
mechanical properties. Rather, empirical measurements of modes of vibration are
made, and these are used to develop more accurate models of its physical structure.
In general, the physics of musical instruments proceeds by translating the
mechanical interactions between components of different material and shape into
vibrational modes, then combining these modes into overall vibratory response.
Particular materials or gross mechanical interactions by themselves are not enough
to identify the characteristic features of a complex sound event—the plucking of a
string sounds radically different if it is connected to a guitar, a harpsichord, or a
harp. The means of specifying these differences physically is through a piecemeal
analysis of the different ways the motion of the string affects, and is amplified by,
the vibratory properties of the instrument as a whole. Thus, the general theory, the
one which subsumes complex mechanical process types that generate sound within
a single framework, is the physics of vibration.
Is there reason to think the physics of vibration can provide a basis adequate to
reduce all timbre categories? Well, we have reason to think it can provide a well-
defined characterization of all possible complex vibrations. Since the Fourier
Theorem applies to n-dimensional waves, and since vibrations are mathematically
analogous to waves (both are periodic motions),15 any complex vibration will be
equivalent to some combination of primitive vibrations. Since the physics of
vibration proceeds by analyzing and combining primitive vibrations (associated
with each mode), it engages in an endeavor that will in principle generate all
complex patterns of vibration.
I’ll argue in the following section that this approach will not in fact successfully
subvene all timbre categories. Nevertheless, let’s pause for a moment and consider
the consequences for an event view of timbre that reduces timbres to sums of simple
vibrations. Timbre physicalism of this form would ensure reduction at the cost of
sacrificing its solution to the similarity problem. Event theorists appeal to the gross
mechanical features of audible events to explain similarities in perceived timbre—
the striking of a hammer, the patter of hail on a tin roof, the bowing of a violin
string—, but these gross features are not in general reducible to, nor recoverable
from, invariants in the pattern of component vibrations. To specify the distinctive
timbre of hail on a tin roof in terms of some invariant in the relative degrees of the
roof’s (and each piece of hail’s!) modes of vibration would be every bit as
counterintuitive and unilluminating as doing so in terms of the relative degrees of
15 There is actually a deep three-way analogy here, between mechanical, acoustical, and electrical
systems. All three involve periodic fluctuations (vibrations, waves, and, e.g., alterations in current), and
thus the corresponding physical theories are intertranslatable. However, since the primitive quantities are
different in each case, and the details of each area are such that the behavior of one may map to the other
in multiple ways, these mappings are merely analogies (rather than mathematical identities). Such
analogies were originally employed (e.g. by Maxwell) to motivate intuitions about electromagnetism, but
now that electrical systems are better understood, they are more frequently used to simplify analysis of
mechanical systems. Another important area of application is at the various interfaces between
mechanical, electrical, and acoustical phenomena: for instance when an electrical signal is translated into
movements of a speaker cone, which themselves are translated into disturbances in the air (see e.g. Olson
1947, Chaps. 4 and 6).
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component sines in the issuing sound wave (and astronomically more difficult). But
if component vibrations are the physical feature to which timbres reduce, it seems
this is exactly what the event physicalist must do.
4.3 Vibrations couple with disturbances
One might think that losing a solution to the similarity problem is an
acceptable price to pay for the reduction of timbre to vibration. Perhaps the
situation is analogous to the metamer problem for color—SSR similarities don’t
explain color similarities, but that does not defeat the identification of color with
SSR. However, there is an important disanalogy between the case of color and the
case of sound, and it is because of this disanalogy that the reduction of timbre to
mechanical vibration ultimately fails. Light in the visible range of the spectrum does
not interact substantively with a surface when reflecting from it, altering its
reflectance properties.16 In contrast, disturbances in the medium surrounding a
mechanical process interact with that process substantively, altering its pattern of
vibration and contributing to the emitted waves. Consequently, there is no
physically principled way to draw a distinction between the contributions of
mechanical vibrations and of nearby disturbances in the medium to determining a
sound event, and thus timbre. Without such a distinction in hand, there is no
principled way to delimit the audible event as a scientifically legitimate kind
independent of the overall pattern of interaction culminating in a wave incident at
the ear. If audible events are not scientific kinds, then they are not fit basis for a
properly physicalist reduction.
My claim is that sound events (typically) involve an active coupling between
disturbances in the medium and vibrations in the object. In order to understand what
this claim amounts to, and its significance, it is important to distinguish it from two
nearby facts that do not block timbre event physicalism. The first is just the
observation that features of the medium may change the perceived quality of the
sound from that determined by its source. The violin played next to me and the one
played down the hall do sound similar, but they also sound in some sense different.
An analogous phenomenon in color vision is that of haze, when particles in the air
diffract some wavelengths of light, altering the color signal during its journey from
surface to eye. Just as we attribute invariant colors to surfaces despite haze, we
attribute invariant timbres to sources despite intervening changes in the sound
signal—this does not undermine an identification of the timbre of the original sound
event with properties of that event.
A second observation is that disturbances in a medium can cause sound events.
This also does not necessarily undermine an identification of sound qualities with
properties of the event. For instance, a wave may interact with an object by inducing
it to vibrate at its resonant frequencies, as when an opera singer shatters a wine glass
by inducing it to vibrate with her voice. Resonance such as this is an essentially
16 At least not typically, or at relevant time scales. Some substances are unstable in visible light, and
some properties of objects are changed over long time periods of exposure to light (think fading of dyes in
sunlight); nevertheless, these effects do not contribute to our real-time perception of color.
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passive phenomena. While the wave initiates, and perhaps even drives it, the quality
of the sound event itself is determined by the resonant properties of the object. So,
even in a case of resonance induced by a disturbance in the medium, there is a
principled boundary between properties of the sound event, and nearby properties of
the medium.
The much more problematic case obtains when a disturbance dynamically
couples with a mechanical process to constitutively determine properties of the
sound event. A dramatic example of such dynamical coupling from outside the
realm of sound is the 1940 Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse. The original Tacoma
Narrows Bridge was known for vertical (transverse) vibrations in high wind. On
November 7, 1940, however, it exhibited a never before seen mode of vibration,
twisting back and forth around its longitudinal axis. Subsequent analysis has shown
that the cause was not mere resonance, but rather aeroelastic flutter—a phenomenon
that occurs when coupling between a vibrating body and a fluid produces positive
feedback. The eddies in the air caused by rotation of the bridge themselves caused a
magnification in that rotation. Over the course of 45 minutes, this positive feedback
induced the bridge’s rotation to gradually increase, until eventually reinforcing
cables snapped and it collapsed. The point of this example is that the bridge’s
behavior was determined more by the nature of its interaction with the surrounding
air flow than by its intrinsic resonant modes, and thus the collapse can only be
understood in terms of the dynamic interaction between a mechanical vibration and
waves in the surrounding medium (Billah and Scanlan 1991).
Less dramatically, the physics of musical instruments depends also on dynamic
interactions between mechanical vibrations and the surrounding medium. In the
case of violins, for instance, some modes of vibration are mechanical, involving
movement of the body, but some are acoustical, involving waves in the air cavity.
These mechanical and acoustical fluctuations are coupled with each other, and any
explanation of the sound of the violin must appeal to both.17 The importance of such
interactions becomes even more acute in the case of wind instruments. In some
cases, such as the flute or trumpet, the initial mechanical event, the vibration of the
lips, determines very little about the overall sound, while the resonant behavior of
the trapped column of air is enormously important.
One might think that an easy way to circumvent these examples, and maintain the
integrity of violin bowing and flute blowing as well-defined audible events, would
be to treat the trapped air as a special case. The part of the medium filled with waves
coupled to the mechanical vibrations of the object is internal to it, doesn’t that give
us a natural boundary between these waves and the rest of the medium? And won’t
that natural boundary serve to circumscribe the event? The problem with this
approach is that it is precisely the continuity between waves occurring in the
instrument’s cavity and the surrounding medium that ensures the musical sound
event is successful—only at low-impedence boundaries such as those at the f-holes
of a violin or the bell of a trumpet is sound quality efficiently communicated. In
17 For instance, Bretos et al. (1999) identify omission of the vibrations in the air cavity from their
computational model as a primary source of the discrepancy between its behavior and empirically
recorded violin body vibrations.
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other words, there is no physically significant boundary between waves internal to
the instrument and external to it, so the fact that part of the medium is enclosed by
the instrument also does not serve to establish a physical boundary between sound
event and traveling wave. From the standpoint of physics, there is a distinction
between mechanical vibrations and disturbances in a medium, but not a distinction
between those oscillations contributing to an audible event and those that merely
constitute its effects. More generally, acoustics and the physics of musical
instruments treat mechanical vibrations, near sound waves, and far sound waves as
all homogeneously interacting. Analysis of the ‘‘sound’’ of a violin does not stop at
its body, but at the other end of the concert hall, in the ear of the listener.18
5 Conclusion
What then are the prospects for timbre physicalism? The situation is subtly
disanalogous to that of color physicalism. In the case of color, would-be physicalists
were impressed with the constancy with which colors are assigned to distal surfaces
and were able to find a well-defined physical kind, surface spectral reflectance, to
serve as a reduction basis. The question of whether timbre, or sound in general,
should be identified with proximal or distal physical categories is much more vexed.
Our ability to spatially locate sound sources, and to individuate them by timbre, has
motivated a form of timbre physicalism that identifies timbres with properties of
distal resonant events. However, the most obvious candidates for the distal
correlates of event timbre do not appear to form a physically well-defined category.
In contrast, correlates of proximal wave timbre do appear to constitute a well-
defined category, but reduction of sound to properties of the proximal signal would
fail to account for apparent spatial and categorical aspects of sound perception.
I have considered the possibility that event timbre might be identified with either
vibrations of rigid bodies, or with some combination of such vibrations and nearby
waves. I argued that the first suggestion, while well-defined, does not subvene all
relevant aspects of an audible event; and the second suggestion, if it is to include
only properties of the distal sound event as intuitively understood, is not
scientifically well-defined. This does not mean that other candidates for the
physical reduction of timbre are not available. For instance, if the would-be event
timbre physicalist can find some physical feature of vibrations and nearby waves
that captures their intuitive unity in an audible event, and appropriately
18 Compare: ‘‘The study of acoustics is greatly simplified by understanding the circumstances governing
the flow of sound energy because instruments, ears, and rooms can all be viewed as networks of
interconnected vibrating elements’’ (Loy 2007, 325).
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distinguishes them from emitted waves, it would serve as a plausible candidate for
timbre physicalism.19
A second option for those who would identify timbres with properties of events is
to adopt a more modest, non-reductive realism. One possibility is ecological realism
along the lines suggested by Gibson. An ecological theory of timbre, identifying it
with event properties of interest to organisms on an evolutionary timescale, would
better satisfy many of the intuitive arguments in support of timbre ‘‘physicalism,’’
without requiring any strong reductive program. Nevertheless, there are challenges
for this approach as well: what is the full taxonomy of ecological audible events?
What ecological features determine timbre similarity? These are topics on which
philosophers of sound might fruitfully collaborate with musicologists and ecological
psychologists.
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